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Philosophy
Between Facts and Utopia: Habermas and Benhabib from Deliberative Democracy 
to Democratic Deficits
Chairperson: David Sherman
The thesis proposes to examine two accounts o f democratic legitimation and 
institutionalization within the deliberative democracy tradition o f political theory.
The normative principles grounding these accounts are derived from discourse 
ethics. The first section begins by examining the attempt by Jurgen Habermas to 
ground the validity of moral norms in a neo-Kantian transcendental account o f an 
“ideal speech situation” as well as the rejection of such an account by Seyla Benhabib 
in a neo-Hegelian critique. The first section then explores the attempts in deliberative 
democracy by Habermas and Benhabib to ground a procedural account of 
democratic legitimation in normative principles derived from discourse ethics and 
their institutionalization in a civic public sphere.
The second section begins by dealing with two of the major traditional criticisms 
identified by Seyla Benhabib against deliberative democracy, the liberal criticism that 
such an account cannot adequately guarantee individual rights and autonomy, and 
the institutional realist critique that the principles of deliberative democracy are not 
capable of institutionalization in modem, complex societies. In meeting these 
objections from the broader tradition of modern democratic political theory, both 
Habermas and Benhabib emphasize the compatibility o f deliberative democracy with 
existing political institutions. I argue that deliberative democracy then risks 
generating an internal tension between the strong conception o f free and equal 
participation generated by discourse ethics and their own institutional account The 
central issue here is that while analytically separating the civil public sphere and its 
own logic from other social spheres like the cultural or economic, both democratic 
theorists fail sufficiently to subsequently thematize the public sphere’s relation to 
other social spheres and the possible intrusions o f these spheres into deliberative 
bodies in such a manner as to constitute democratic deficits. I endorse Nancy 
Fraser’s work as a more adequate account o f deliberative democracy for these 
reasons. I conclude that deliberative democratic theory should be seen less as an 
account of the legitimation o f existing democratic institutions than as normative 
grounds for pushing for the further democratization of political, economic, and 
cultural institutions.
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Section One
DISCOURSE ETHICS TO DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
I propose to examine two accounts of democratic legitimation and 
institutionalization within the deliberative democracy tradition o f political theory. The 
normative principles grounding these accounts are derived from discourse ethics, the central 
principle o f which is as follows: “Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could 
meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse. ’* 
While agreeing on the principal norm o f discourse ethics, Jurgen Habermas and Seyla 
Benhabib disagree on its justification. The first sub-section examines Habermas’ neo- 
Kantian account, which attempts to ground the validity o f moral norms in the quasi- 
transcendental presuppositions that purportedly underlie discursive argumentation, 
presuppositions that prefigure ‘an ideal speech situation.’ Benhabib rejects such an account 
in a neo-Hegelian critique and proposes an alternative justification o f communicative ethics 
as a form o f practical rationality that is a world historical and collective achievement, 
insisting then on both its historical and sociological specificity as well as its claim to a validity 
that is culture-transcending. The difference in justifications results in different conceptions 
o f the relation o f morality to ethics in the communicative paradigm. While Habermas insists 
on a strict separation, insisting that the function o f discourse ethics is to ground universal 
moral norms, Benhabib includes ethical contents in her conception, proposing to add a 
community o f needs and solidarity to that community o f rights envisioned by Habermas.
1 Jurgen Habermas. “Discourse Ethics: Notes Toward a Program o f Justification,” Moral Consciousness 
and Communicative Action, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), p. 67
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The second sub-section explores the attempts by Habermas and Benhabib to ground 
a procedural account o f democratic legitimation in principles derived from discourse ethics 
and to institutionalize them in a civic public sphere. While abandoning his commitment to 
both a quasi-transcendental justification and a strict separation o f the moral and ethical 
realms, Habermas still formulates his account o f democratic legitimation in very Kantian 
terms. Since in modem societies, the legislators and subjects o f law are distinct, in contrast 
to the Kantian conception o f autonomy, the point of political theory, as Habermas sees it, is 
to again mediate the two in order to develop adequate accounts o f both private and public 
autonomy. In complex, modem societies, Habermas sees this happening primarily in the 
deliberations o f the civil, public sphere. The modem political tradition, typified for 
Habermas by the liberal and republican conceptions, fails to do justice to public and private 
autonomy by privileging either one form o f autonomy or the other, and thus fails to see their 
mutual dependence. Only in a procedural account, Habermas argues, can their co-originary 
status be properly articulated. While sharing Habermas’ general formulation o f deliberative 
democracy and its emphasis on the civil public sphere, Benhabib differentiates herself in 
taking the primary object o f public discourse to be not only the administration o f power by 
the state but the norms regulating social action between actors that do not require coercion. 
In a parallel fashion then to her critique o f Habermas’ formulation o f discourse ethics, 
Benhabib argues that Habermas’ account o f deliberative democracy still suffers from a 
Kantian narrowness, with the overriding concern being now with law instead of morality. 
Such a conception for Benhabib again unnecessarily and unjustifiably truncates discursive 
potentials.
The second section begins by dealing with two o f the major traditional criticisms 
identified by Seyla Benhabib against deliberative democracy, the liberal criticism that such an
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account cannot adequately guarantee individual rights and autonomy, and the institutional 
realist critique that the principles o f  deliberative democracy are not capable of 
institutionalization in modem, complex societies. In an attempt to meet these objections 
from the broader tradition o f modem democratic political theory, both Habermas and 
Benhabib emphasize that their deliberative democratic accounts are compatible with existing 
political institutions. But if this is the case, I argue, deliberative democracy risks generating 
an internal tension between the strong conception o f free and equal participation generated 
by discourse ethics and their own institutional account. The central issue here is that while 
analytically separating the civil public sphere and its own logic from other social spheres like 
the cultural or economic, both democratic theorists fail sufficiently to subsequently 
thematize the public sphere’s relation to other social spheres and the possible intrusions o f 
these spheres into deliberative bodies in such a manner as to constitute democratic deficits.
I conclude that deliberative democratic theory should be seen less as an account o f the 
legitimation o f existing democratic institutions than as normative grounds for pushing for the 
further democratization o f political, economic, and cultural institutions.
1.1 Habermas and Benhabib on Discourse Ethics
Both Benhabib’s and Habermas’ projects originate at the same point: the by-now- 
well familiar impasse o f the Frankfurt School. “If  the plight o f the Enlightenment and of 
cultural rationalization only reveals the culmination o f the identity logic, constitutive o f 
reason, then the theory o f the dialectic o f Enlightenment, which is carried out with the tools
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of this very same reason, perpetuates the very structure o f domination it condemns.”2 The 
reason for this impasse, Habermas argued, was the work-centered philosophy o f history the 
Frankfurt School had inherited from Marx. The irony o f the Frankfurt School, however, 
was to eliminate the progressive and normative implications in a progressive notion o f 
modernity that Marx himself had relied on. The real was rational, but increasing 
rationalization was only progressive domination. Consequently, in The Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adomo were led to posit an ‘other’ o f reason in aesthetic 
mimesis. But relegated to advanced avant-garde art, such a conception left theoretical 
critique and emancipatory political praxis without a foundation.
Habermas has over the last forty years attempted the Herculean task of 
reconstructing critical theory’s social-theoretic and normative foundations around the terms 
o f language and communication. Habermas’ first attempt at the reconstruction o f critical 
theory’s normative foundations took a very self-consciously Kantian form in its emphasis on 
autonomy and self-legislation. Only those universalizable norms which moral agents will 
themselves are valid. Habermas’ procedural account though differs from Kant’s in its 
dialogical character. It is not the moral agent in self-reflection that tests the universalizability 
o f a maxim, but actual moral agents in discussion. This principle Habermas formulates as: 
“Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval o f all 
affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse. Habermas’ account then 
focuses not on the ideal faculties o f a moral agent, but on the conditions of moral discourse 
that would validate the result: a sincere dialogue open to all participants, topics, and demands
2 Seyla Benhabib. Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study in the Foundations o f  Critical Theory,. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 169
4
for justification. Whereas Kant constructed an ideal agent reflecting on his actual reason, 
Habermas models morality on actual participants in an ‘ideal speech situation.’ The ideal 
speech situation specifies the “formal properties that discursive argumentations would have 
to possess if the consensus thus attained were to be distinguished from a mere compromise 
or an agreement of convenience.”4 It is less something actual that occurs, or some telos to 
aim at as an ideal society, than a regulative principle by which to normatively judge actual 
moral dialogue. It is in this manner that he hopes to evade the traditional Hegelian 
objections o f abstraction and otherworldliness to a Kantian account.
Seyla Benhabib has been a sympathetic fellow traveler in critical theory’s 
communicative turn, but she has been an equally austere critic o f its Kantian formulation. 
Habermas argues that the constraints on moral discourse envisioned by the “ideal speech 
situation” are presumed by competent argumentation as such. While accepting the general 
formulation of discourse ethics — a moral discourse open to all participants who have equal 
rights (demand for justification, initiation o f topics, etc.) within that discourse — Benhabib 
rejects Habermas’ quasi-transcendental justification. In Critique, Norm and Utopia, she 
systematically outlines her reasons by reformulating Hegelian objections to Kant’s original 
account. Whereas for Habermas we are bound to respectful and egalitarian moral discourse 
in so far as we are speech users, Benhabib argues that moral respect and egalitarian 
reciprocity only have force for a certain kind o f speaker, a post-conventional modem one. 
While this is a contingent fact, it is not an arbitrary one; after the fact o f modernity, so to 
speak, arguments can be given to support respectful and egalitarian dialogue. The
3 Jiirgen Habermas. “Discourse Ethics: Notes Toward a Program o f Justification,” Moral Consciousness 
and Communicative Action, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), p. 67
4 Benhabib. Critique, Norm, and Utopia, p. 284
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transcendentalist account o f discourse ethics can’t work, because it either just doesn’t follow 
from a m in im a l conception of the rules o f argumentation or surreptitiously presumes 
psychological and sociological premises to which it is not entided:
Either this principle explicates the meaning o f  rational consent in such a way that nothing 
new is added to the available explication o f  the argumentation procedure in practical 
discourse; or this principle defines the meaning o f  rational consent in some additional way, 
but this definition is neither the only one compatible with the accepted rules o f  
argumentation, nor can it be said to follow from the rules o f  argumentation without the 
introduction o f  additional assumptions not belonging to the specified rules o f  argument.5
While Benhabib’s particular arguments against Habermas’ Kantian formulation of 
discourse ethics are Hegelian-inspired, they are part of a more general line o f inquiry into the 
tradition o f critical theory that is really quite imaginative. Going back to Marx’s Capital, 
Benhabib distinguishes two contrasting models on social analysis. O n the one hand is the 
intersubjective participants’ perspective, which presents crises as “lived phenomena o f 
alienation, exploitation, and injustice.”6 On the other is the transsubjective, theoretician’s 
perspective, that o f an outside third-person observer outlining the functional systemic 
necessity of crises. The unfortunate tendency o f first-generation critical theory, Benhabib 
believes, has been to privilege the latter perspective, stemming from its continued reliance on 
what Benhabib calls the presuppositions o f a “philosophy o f the subject.”
First, that there is a unitary model o f  human activity which can be defined as ‘objectification’ 
or ‘production’; second, that history is constituted by the activities o f  this one subject — 
humanity or mankind. Third, that human history presents the unfolding o f  the capacities o f  
this one subject; and fourth, that emancipation consists in our becoming conscious o f  and 
acting in accordance with the knowledge that the constituting and constituted subjects o f  
history — the subject o f  the past and the subject o f  the future — are one.7
The collective historical subject is for Benhabib a fiction that comes at the cost o f fa ilin g  to 
acknowledge human plurality. “ (The] shift to the language of an anonymous species-subject 
preempts the experience o f moral and political activity as a consequence of which alone a
5 Ibid., p. 308
6 Ibid., p. 123
7 Ibid., pp. 129-130
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genuine ‘we’ can emerge. A collectivity is not constituted theoretically but is formed out of 
the moral and political struggles o f fighting actors.”8
Against his own anti-teleological and anti-metaphysical intentions, Habermas’ 
schema o f evolutionary naturalism also falls victim to this trend. While replacing teleology 
with a developmental logic o f cognitive learning potentials aimed at solving problems within 
historical processes, social actors nonetheless become mere identical bearers o f functional 
imperatives:
Habermas reverts to the discourse o f  the philosophy o f  the subject at those points in his 
theory when the reconstruction o f  species competencies o f  an anonymous subject — 
humanity as such — does not remain merely a fruitful research hypothesis, but assumes the 
role o f  a philosophical narrative o f  the formative history o f  the subject o f  history.9
This perspective is no less apparent in Habermas’ discourse ethics. In treating discourse 
ethics as a sphere o f deliberation over norms that can be freely and consensually agreed 
upon by all concerned, Habermas treats this ‘all’ as a homogenous, undifferentiated mass, or, 
in so far as they are individuals, treats those individuals only in terms of their commonality. 
This leads Habermas to separate the ethical sphere from moral discourse. He excludes the 
ethical on the grounds that conceptions o f the good life cannot be reconciled with the 
principle o f universality. But the history o f actual political and moral struggles has not been 
so exclusive. The fights have been as much over needs and identity as they have been over 
rights. The collectivity o f discourse participants that Habermas would like to exclude from 
considering the ethical is a product o f those very ethical discourses.
Unlike Hegel, however, Benhabib’s attempt to incorporate the ethical sphere into 
discourse ethics does not have a conservative trajectory. She argues instead that it is the 
Kantian formulation that truncates normative discourse. Contra Hegel, Benhabib is not a
8 Ibid., p. 331
9 Ibid., p. 330
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believer in a homogenous ethical totality, which would only reinstate a reifying, third-person 
perspective. Her emphasis is instead on the contestation within and between these ethical 
horizons by particular social actors. By ignoring the particular life histories of these actors, 
the Kantian perspective misses important ethical distinctions, and perhaps even moral ones. 
Sensitivity to particularity and differences, and the attendant ethical cognitions such as love 
or caring, would serve to broaden, not constrict moral discourse. Thus, Benhabib argues, 
moral discourses should be attuned as much to ‘concrete others’ as to a ‘generalized other.’
It is the perspective o f the ‘generalized other’ that has prevented Habermas from 
making good on his own advance o f Kohlberg’s moral theory, an advance that insists on 
“universalizable need interpretations.” For Habermas, according to Benhabib, in 
“[discourses in which our needs and the cultural traditions shaping them are fhematized, the 
semantic content of those interpretations defining happiness and the good life, are brought 
to life, and what is fitting, pleasing, and fulfilling are debated are named . . . ‘aesthetic- 
expressive ones.’”10 But then Habermas sharply distinguishes such discourses from the 
moral, because he argues they are dependent on concrete, cultural traditions. Habermas 
himself, however, implicitly relies on these traditions in his formulation o f the ideal speech 
situation, since such rules about inclusivity and symmetry in moral argumentation do not 
strictly follow from a pragmatics o f language but already have imbedded in them certain 
presuppositions o f fairness and equality. These are presuppositions that Benhabib shares, 
but she shares them not because one happens to enter into discourse, but because one is 
already situated in a post-conventional, universalist tradition. These discourses then are not 
as distinct as Habermas would like. Even in his formulation o f discourse ethics, aesthetic- 
expressive discourses are assumed as given attributes of the participants involved. These
10 Ibid., p. 338
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discourses, however, are not merely given, nor are aesthetic-expressive discourses only within 
a given cultural tradition. By bracketing these considerations through the perspective o f a 
‘generalized other’ Habermas robs moral discourse o f much o f its significance.
For Benhabib, needs and their interpretations are something to be argued about and 
potentially transformed, not merely as premises on the way to universalizable norms, but 
along with norms as the central objectives of moral discourse. The consequence o f this is 
not merely to open up considerations o f particular life histories in regards to norms, but to 
overturn any essentiallyprivatistic and individual conception of needs. Rather what is fundamentally 
important for Benhabib is the potential o f communication to transform interests and self­
interpretations. By making happiness political, and in this Benhabib is self-consciously 
following the Frankfurt School, she is also reopening an overly juridical and legalistic 
conception of discourse ethics to deliberation about the good life and the utopian horizon.
Benhabib has argued that the community of rights must be complemented by that o f
needs and solidarity:
They are the norms o f  solidarity, friendship, love, and care. Such relations require in various 
ways what I do, and that you expect me to do in face o f  your needs, more than would be 
requited o f  me as a right-bearing person. In treating you in accordance with the norms o f  
solidarity, friendship, love and care, I confirm not only your humanity but your human 
individuality.11
By breaking down the barriers o f the traditionally liberal public-private distinction, Benhabib 
hopes to incorporate virtues previously relegated to the private realm in public life.
Benhabib states herself that “the norms of our interaction are usually private, non- 
institutional ones.”12 But these virtues may be generally private, not only because the public 
sphere has been cold but because the private sphere nourishes them with particular warmth.
11 ibid., p. 341
12 I t .  .VI
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Intimacy does not stand in a merely fortuitous relation to love and friendship but as its 
ground, an intimacy that the public sphere by definition cannot provide. So with Aristotle 
against Plato’s attempt to make the polis into a family, we might wonder whether such a 
totalizing conception o f the family might be more damaging to intimacy and these relations 
than any benefit the state could gain by them. It’s really quite difficult to see then how 
Benhabib’s conception could be translated into political terms. The issue becomes not 
merely political affects but one o f participation. To the collective ‘generalized other’ 
Benhabib counterpoises the individual and his or her particular life history. But it is hard to 
imagine how everyone’s particular life history could be accommodated in the political realm.
If  Habermas’ moral discourse is too exclusive, Benhabib might seem to stretch the 
conditions o f its possibility. Between a spartan universality and a maudlin particularity, both 
thinkers might be said to have excluded the political as a realm where commonality and 
difference are negotiated and where neither strict consensus nor love can provide an 
adequate criterion. While it is notable that Benhabib conceives o f  the community of 
solidarity and needs as a complement to, not a replacement of, the community o f rights, she 
is unable to adequately integrate them  As one eminent critical theorist has stated, what is 
needed is a notion o f ‘collective concrete others.’13 It is not then surprising that both 
theorists turn to politics quite explicidy in their later work, with the turn from discourse 
ethics to deliberative democracy.
13 Nancy Fraser. “Toward a Discourse Ethic o f Solidarity,” Praxis International 5 (January 1986)
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1.2 Habermas’ Account of Deliberative Democracy
In Habermas’ later work there has been a marked shift from discourse ethics, at least 
with respect to its particular attention to the ideal speech situation. The ideal speech 
community and its near otherworldly status have been replaced by a focus on actual liberal 
democracy. Habermas is renowned for specific engagements with his critics, and while no 
explicit and published debate the likes o f which Habermas had with Gadamer and Luhmann 
exists with Benhabib, considerations along the likes o f her critique have certainly played a 
role in his emerging thought. Unlike the quasi-transcendental presuppositions o f the ideal 
speech situation, liberal democracy for Habermas is not a theoretical posit but is taken for 
granted as an historical achievement, while Habermas’ critique becomes a more 
straightforward and eminent normative critique o f democratic deficits, the fullest elaboration 
of which to date has been his between Facts and Norms.
This is not to say that discourse ethics itself has disappeared, for the best account o f 
democratic legitimacy, Habermas and Benhabib both argue, is to be found in a deliberative 
account o f democracy, an enterprise that draws heavily on the theory o f discourse ethics and 
its idea o f unconstrained dialogue among free and equal participants. This is most evident in 
the articulation o f the public sphere. Habermas finds here a discourse with its own built-in 
ideality. The normative constraints here are not a transcendental, theoretical posit but 
historically achieved rights; civic rights, political rights, and finally in the twentieth century, 
social rights all become conditions o f free and equal participation. Achieved through 
political struggle and moral discourse, they are themselves subject to continuing 
interpretation in the public sphere.
11
Surrendering the transcendental justification has also opened up Habermas’ 
conception o f moral discourse. No longer a specialized discourse, the public sphere finds its 
epitome in the everyday face-to-face conversation in which specialized discourses 
intermingle and the theoretician’s voice finds no particular privilege.
To be sure, ethical discourses aimed at achieving a collective self-understanding — discourses 
in which participants attempt to clarify how they understand themselves as members o f  a 
particular nation, as members o f  a community or a state, as inhabitants o f  a region, etc., 
which traditions they wish to cultivate, how  they should treat each other, minorities, and 
marginal groups, in what sort o f  society they want to live — constitute an important part o f  
politics.14
Habermas’ new theory is also much more attentive to the notion o f “difference” in 
democratic discourse and the need to include those voices without which formal rights risk 
perpetuating substantive inequalities.15 Rather than essentializing “difference,” Habermas 
argues that adequate recognition for minorities, or individuals more generally, can only be 
achieved through a procedural account that integrates both private and public autonomy.
For Habermas, it is as members o f civil society that individuals exercise their private autonomy. 
“As bearers o f individual rights, citizens enjoy the protections o f the government as long as 
they pursue their private interests within the boundaries drawn by legal statutes.”16 It is as 
political citizens that individuals exercise their public autonomy. Political rights “guarantee 
instead the possibility o f participating in a common practice, through which the citizens can 
first make themselves into what they want to be—politically responsible subjects o f a 
community o f free and equal citizens.”17 In fact, Habermas’ account is meant to show that 
there are no viable private rights without public autonomy, that the equal value o f rights 
cannot be protected without open and public deliberation about what these tights mean and 
what their (different) effects are upon the populace. “For, in the final analysis, private legal
14Jurgen Habermas, ed. Ciaron Cronin and Pablo De Greiff. “Three Normative Models o f Democracy,”
The Inclusion o f  the Other, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), p. 244
15 Habermas takes feminism as his model here.
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subjects cannot enjoy even equal individual liberties if they themselves do not jointly exercise 
their civic autonomy in order to specify clearly which interests and standards are justified, 
and to agree on the relevant respects that determine when like cases should be treated alike 
and different cases differently.”18
Stemming from his earlier work in discourse ethics, Habermas’ central argument for 
deliberative democracy has been that only a proceduralist account o f democracy can do 
justice to the two fundamental normative intuitions o f democratic politics, public and private 
autonomy. Habermas has explicitly contrasted his account with what he considers the two 
traditional accounts of democratic legitimation, republicanism and liberalism. While 
republicanism prioritizes the pole of public autonomy, liberalism privileges private 
autonomy. Only the proceduralist account, Habermas argues, fully integrates the co- 
originary nature and interdependence o f public and private autonomy. At the institutional 
level, deliberative democracy attempts to fuse a republican emphasis on direct participation 
with liberal structures like the market and constitutional state, hoping thereby to balance 
solidarity and democratic will-formation as a means o f steering society with money and 
administrative power. Habermas’ attempt to integrate both the normative impetus and 
institutional programs of republicanism and liberalism is both ambitious and elegant.
The internal relation between the rule of law and democracy for Habermas begins 
with the advent o f modernity. With the collapse o f metaphysical paradigms, positive law 
must seek legitimacy in the legislation of autonomous subjects. The law in turn
16 Ibid., p. 240
17 Ibid., p. 241
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institutionalizes this autonomy and gives it sanction and protection. Habermas explicitly 
follows Kant in his conception of both politics and morality, even while giving it a dialogical 
turn. In political philosophy, however, unlike morality, the legislator and addressee o f the 
law must inevitably be split. Habermas’ motivating concern then becomes how the poles of 
public and private autonomy can be mediated in such a fashion that neither is sacrificed.
The way that the democratic tradition has formulated this tension, however, has left it 
irresolvable.
The political autonomy o f  citizens is supposed to be embodied in the self-organization o f  a 
community that gives itself the laws through the sovereign will o f  the people. The private 
autonomy o f  citizens, on the other hand, is supposed to take the form o f  basic rights that 
guarantee the anonymous rule o f  law. Once the issue is set up in this way, either idea can be 
upheld only at the expense o f  the other. The intuitive plausible co-originality o f  both ideas 
falls by the wayside.19
Republicanism upholds popular sovereignty at the expense o f  rights, liberalism rights at the 
expense o f popular sovereignty. Deliberative democracy, on the other hand, recognizes that 
without popular sovereignty rights can neither achieve their proper articulation nor, under 
the conditions o f a post-metaphysical modernity, receive their adequate legitimation. 
Similarly, without a system of rights and positive law, the outcomes of democratic 
deliberations cannot claim legitimacy as the fair exchanges o f free and equal participants.
When citizens judge in the light o f  the discourse principle whether the law they make is 
legitimate, they do so under communicative presuppositions that must themselves be legally 
institutionalized in the form o f  political civil rights, and for such institutionalization to occur, 
the legal code as such must be available. But in order to establish this legal code it is 
necessary to create the status o f  legal persons who as bearers o f  individual rights belong to a 
voluntary association o f  citizens and when necessary effectively claim their rights. There is 
no law without the private autonomy o f  legal persons in general. Consequently, without 
basic rights that secure the private autonomy o f  citizens there is also no medium for legally 
institutionalizing the conditions under which these citizens, as citizens o f  a state, can make 
use o f  their public autonomy. Thus private and public autonomy mutually presuppose each
18Jtirgen Habermas, ed. Ciaron Cronin and Pablo De Greiff. “On the Internal Relation between Law and
Democracy,” The Inclusion o f  the Other, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), p. 262
19 Jurgen Habermas. “On the Internal Relation between the Rule o f Law and Democracy,” p. 258
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other in such a way that neither human rights nor popular sovereignty can claim primacy 
over its counterpart20.
These theoretical, normative considerations are not without political, institutional 
significance for Habermas. Any attempt to institutionalize one of the poles o f autonomy 
without due integration o f the other is not only an incomplete account o f democracy for 
Habermas but a self-undermining one, the welfare state being a case in point. While within 
the liberal tradition the conception o f the conditions for the full exercise o f private 
autonomy has grown to include a conception o f economic entitlements, the failure to 
adequately conceive of the co-otiginary status o f public and private autonomy in the service 
of facilitating private autonomy has led to the counterproductive regime of welfare state 
paternalism and normalizing interventions. Rather than underwriting the program o f free and 
equal exercise o f individual liberties, welfare recipients’ stigmatisation and regulatory 
objectification produces a dependent and dejected population.
The liberal program of equal rights and liberties, lacking the institutionalized means 
where those affected by the law have a role in its legislation, can end up working against the 
very equality in whose name the program of the welfare state was carried out.
The individual rights that are meant to guarantee to [citizens] the autonomy to pursue their 
lives in  the private sphere cannot even be adequately formulated unless the affected persons 
themselves first articulate and justify in public debate those aspects that are relevant to equal 
or unequal treatment in typical cases. The private autonomy o f  equally entided citizens can 
be secured only insofar as citizens actively exercise their civic autonomy21
A proceduralist account proceeds under the assumption that a program o f either public or 
private autonomy can only be pursued step in step with the other.
20 Ibid., p. 260
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1.3 Benhabib on Deliberative Democracy
Benhabib draws two major contrasts between deliberative democracy and more 
traditional liberalism, as expounded by Rawls. First, debate in Rawls’ account is restricted to 
constitutional essentials, whereas deliberative democracy doesn’t preemptively censor topics 
o f public discussion. Second, Benhabib’s conception emphasizes real debates over a kind of 
ideal debate seen as a regulative principle. One o f Benhabib’s particular criticisms of 
Habermas’ Kantian discourse ethics was the ambiguous relationship in which it stood to 
Rawls’ theory: focusing at once on both the dialogue’s actual participants but then only on 
what they actually had in common. With deliberative democracy’s public sphere, the 
distinction is more strongly pronounced. While Rawls’ theory has expanded as well to 
include a public sphere, he situates it restrictively within the political system. His model of 
political and constitutional deliberation is therefore the Supreme Court. Deliberative 
democracy’s public sphere is, by contrast, situated outside the political system in varying 
strata o f civic society: from political parties, to citizen’s activist groups to conversations at 
local coffeehouses.
A t this point Habermas and Benhabib certainly look a lot alike, and one might ask 
whether Habermas has just embraced Benhabib’s critique in totality, to which the natural 
response may be that it only appears so at first because Benhabib has embraced (too?) much 
of Habermas. To be sure, most of her discussions o f deliberative democracy — the concern 
with public reason, juridicality, and public institutions — have predominated over the 
concerns with friendship, love, and caring that she championed in Critique, Norm and Utopia. 
One does not detect much utopian rhetoric, or much of an emphasis on 'anticipatory-
21 Ibid., p. 264
16
utopian critique,' in her latest work, such as The Claims of Culture. Have they just split their 
differences? A t first glance the difference between The Claims of Culture and Between Facts and 
Norms may seem to be whether deliberative democracy is being applied to the realm of law 
or to multiculturalism, whether the public sphere is here being developed in terms o f its 
relation to the political system or to a pluralistic society’s culture. I would like to argue that 
deeper theoretical differences remain here, and to do so I would like to take up the line of 
argument relating to the differences between deliberative democracy and more traditional 
models o f liberalism.
What distinguishes deliberative democracy is the importance it gives the public sphere 
as a civic institution. For Benhabib, it is this public sphere that allows deliberative democracy 
to accommodate a reasonable multiculturalism. What is distinctive about Benhabib’s 
account is that it is primarily within the public sphere that multicultural dilemmas are to be 
resolved. “Deliberative democracy sees the free public sphere o f civil society as the principal 
arena for the articulation, contestation, and resolution o f  normative discourses.”22 In 
addition to the two major contrasts that Benhabib draws between her account and Rawls’, 
which are outlined above, there is a third. Deliberative democracy centers its attention on 
non-coercive resolutions in the civil sphere over the coercive measures stemming from the 
state. With this third condition, it is perhaps worth concentrating not only on Benhabib’s 
difference from Rawls but what is arguably her difference from Habermas as well. Certainly 
Rawls sees the public sphere as a political institution whose object is political institutions. 
While Habermas conceives o f the public sphere as a civic institution, the privileged object of 
its deliberation generally seems to be the political system. While by no means excluding the 
political system as a topic o f debate, the privileged object o f deliberation in Benhabib is
22 Seyla Benhabib. The Claims o f  Culture, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 115
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society itself, without the direct intervention in many cases o f the political system and 
legislation. Is Habermas ignoring a crucial dimension o f potentially transformatory political 
praxis here, or is Benhabib just being utopian?
Benhabib is still taking a more Hegelian tack on deliberative democracy. When the 
private-public distinction is blurred, so is the ethical-political. O n the one hand, she argues 
that this opens up horizons o f discourse and potential resolutions that a more strictly 
Kantian conception suppresses. Benhabib reminds us of how many moral and human rights 
issues, such as women’s liberation, start as ethical “for us” issues. “ [CJlaims and arguments 
may change their normative status through democratic deliberation in that ethical considerations 
may become universalî able justice concerns.”23 Here universalizability and morality are not 
prerequisites for entering the public sphere but the result o f it. At the same time Benhabib 
recognizes some Hegelian limitations. Discourse ethics applies, “if and when the democratic 
will o f the participants to do so exists. Let us recall that we engage in discursive practices 
when moral and political conflicts occur and when everyday normative certainties have lost 
their governance.”24 It is still worth asking whether enough democratic will exists to justify 
the emphasis that she puts on discursive resolutions to these dilemmas. Benhabib sidesteps 
the issue, perhaps, by noting that in cases o f intense hostility, juridical solutions also have 
their limitations.
We are now at a point where we may be able to evaluate the continuing and 
sympathetic dispute in critical theory between Benhabib and Habermas in light o f its past.
23Ib id , p. 144
24Ibid.,p. 115
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Both theorists have undertaken revisions in the move from discourse ethics to deliberative 
democracy. Yet certain undercurrents and commitments have not changed. To be sure, 
Habermas has replaced his quasi-transcendentalist normative justification with a much more 
historicized and immanent critique o f bourgeois democracy, which means that the 
specialized discourse of morality, proceeding in terms regulated by the ideal speech situation, 
has been replaced by the everyday and unspecialized democratic public sphere. But the 
underlying objective of Habermas’ work, however, has still been to justify universal norms. 
The privileged object of discourse in the public sphere for Habermas is the political system. 
His legalistic conception o f morality, with which Benhabib took issue, has ultimately only 
been replaced by an overriding concern with law. His continuing emphasis then remains on 
conceptualizing legitimacy through the free and uncoerced discourse o f relevant participants 
about the relatively impersonal order regulating those participants’ conduct within a system 
of articulated individual rights.
Benhabib, in her latest work, has given up the more immediate call for an 
“anticipatory-utopian critique o f the present” that motivated Critique, Norm, and Utopia. 
Friendship, love, and a more radically individualist posture are not the main focus o f her 
concerns here. Benhabib’s emphasis remains on open discourse and normative interactions 
unrestricted by impersonal systems. She seems to emphasize that the discourse itself should 
have a binding character on democratic participants; law is a second-rate solution to 
voluntary compliance. The privileged object of appeal o f democratic associations, then, is 
not the political system but civil society itself. Is this emphasis, though, in her political 
program any more viable than her seeming previous call for universal human tenderness?
19
Habermas himself has taken up the issue of utopia more directly.25 The issue here for 
him is the exhaustion of utopian energies and their potential renewal. Traditionally, argues 
Habermas, the notion of utopia has been based on that of social labor. But this conception 
has exhausted itself in the monetarization and bureacratization o f the welfare state.
Opposed to these two mediums o f steering Habermas juxtaposes that o f solidarity. 
Habermas identifies three arenas: that o f political elites, preestablished and propertied 
groups, and
a third arena in which subde communication flows determine the form o f  political culture 
and, with the help o f  definitions o f  reality, compete for what Gramsci called cultural 
hegemony; this is where shifts in the trend o f  the Zeitgeist take place. The interaction o f  
among these arenas is not easily grasped. Up to now processes in the middle arena seem to 
have had priority. Wherever the empirical answer turns out to be, our practicalproblem can in 
any case be seen more readily now. any project that wants to shift the balance in favor o f  
regulation through solidarity has to mobilize the lower arena against the two upper ones.26
Habermas himself certainly seems much closer to Benhabib now. The trouble starts when 
Habermas does develop something o f an ‘empirical answer,’ which perhaps blunts the more 
radical democratic thrust apparent here.
25 Jurgen Habermas, ed. Steven Seidman. “The Crisis o f the Welfare and the Exhaustion of Utopian 
Energies,” Jurgen Habermas on Politics and Society: A Reader, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989)
Section Two
DEMOCRATIC DEFICITS IN  DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
So far my purpose has been to articulate a development within the communicative
turn in critical theory between two largely sympathetic thinkers. I would like to turn now
more explicidy to criticism of deliberative democracy. In the first sub-section I will deal with
two of the major traditional criticisms against deliberative democracy identified by Seyla
Benhabib. In  identifying the particular responses Seyla Benhabib makes to these criticisms, I
will argue that what they have in common, according to deliberative democracy, is a
misunderstanding o f the institutional trajectory of deliberative democracy, and that the
criticisms can be blunted by a more adequate characterization of the institutionalization in
deliberative democracy of the norms elucidated by discourse ethics.
Before proceeding, however, it is important to reiterate what the general principles
of deliberative democracy derived from discourse ethics are, since it is precisely in light of
such principles that questions o f deliberative institutions must be arbitrated.
The basic idea behind this model is that only those norms (i.e. general rules o f action and 
institutional arrangements) can be said to be valid (i.e. morally binding), which would be 
agreed to by all those affected by their consequences, if  such agreement were reached as 
a consequence o f a process of deliberation that had the following features: 1) 
participation in such deliberation is governed by the norms o f equality and symmetry; all 
have the same chance to initiate speech acts, to question, to interrogate, and to open 
debate; 2) all have the right to question the assigned topics o f conversation; and 3) all 
have the right to initiate reflexive arguments about the very rules o f the discourse 
procedure and the way in which they are applied or carried out.27
I will argue that in meeting these objections from the broader tradition o f Anglo- 
American democratic political theory, both Habermas and Benhabib emphasize the 
compatibility o f deliberative democracy with existing political institutions, but that such an
26 Ibid., p. 297
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emphasis risks generating an internal tension between the strong conception o f free and 
equal participation generated by discourse ethics and its own institutional account.
Habermas will be the subject o f the first sub-section, Benhabib o f the second. In the third 
sub-subsection I will consider Nancy Fraser’s own work on mediating the recognitive and 
redistributive paradigms o f justice, and contrast it with Benhabib’s own account, before 
concluding in sub-section four with my own recommendations.
The democratic opponents of deliberative democracy for Benhabib come from three
* 28 major camps:
First, liberal theorists will express concern that such a strong model would lead to the 
corrosion o f  individual liberties and may in fact destabilize the rule o f  la w . . .  institutionalists 
and realists consider this discourse model hopelessly naive, maybe even dangerous, its 
seeming plebiscitary and anti-institutional implications.29
These camps raise questions about the institutional implications o f deliberative democracy, 
which is considered to be either intrusive or anarchically utopian. The liberal worry 
expresses a long-standing concern in political theory over the potential tyranny of democracy 
and the whim of majoritarian decisions. The rule of the majority risks the transformation o f 
a stable rule of law into passing fancies and the persecution of minorities in the majoritarian 
interest By contrast, the liberal emphasis on individual rights is intended to protect 
individuals and preserve the freedoms o f citizens. Democracy for the liberal must proceed 
from this bedrock.
The institutional realist extends this critique, arguing that deliberative democracy 
risks not only democratic tyranny but anarchy. Such a strong normative conception would
27 Seyla Benhabib. “Toward a Deliberative Model o f Democratic Legitimacy,” Democracy and Difference: 
Contesting the Boundaries o f  the Political, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 70
28 The third major camp for Benhabib is the feminist charge that the universalist and rationalist public 
sphere which is the province o f white males excludes alternative modes o f “situated” discourse such as 
storytelling and greeting, and therefore marginalizes women and other minorities. Many o f the subsequent 
points are sympathetic to this position, but I leave the issue aside for another time.
29 Seyla Benhabib. “Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy,”, p. 74
22
rule out any o f the prevailing democratic institutions and normatively undermine them, 
without being able to propose an alternative that could meet the demands o f modem, 
complex societies. One is left, in other words, with an abstract rejection o f existing 
democratic institutions based on an unrealizable utopian longing for a universal town hall.
Habermas himself has repeatedly warned against taking discourse theoretic principles 
too literally as a model for their institutionalization in deliberative democracy. The model is 
not one o f consensus-based decision making among a small, assembled group, as one might 
assume from the ideal speech situation. But the ideal speech situation for Habermas itself 
was never meant to be taken too literally as a schema by which to organize deliberations but 
rather as a regulative ideal against which proposed norms could be measured and criticized. 
The model for deliberative democracy then is not that o f a free-for-all in a sort o f mass 
assembly. Far from endorsing a classical model o f the forum in contrast to the complexity 
o f modern societies, Habermas argues that only the procedural model is adequate to the task 
o f legitimating democracy in such complex, differentiated societies in which the ruled and 
rulers can be neither immediately identified nor strictly separated. So perhaps then the best 
means by which to retort to the previously outlined criticism of deliberative democracy in 
this introduction would be to return to Habermas’ elaboration of the relation o f public to 
private autonomy as he sets it out in the tradition o f modem democratic political theory.
But Habermas’ account, I argue in turn, while responding to his critics opens up tensions 
with his own normative commitments.
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2.1 Democratic Deficits in Habermas
\
The role o f the democratic process in liberal and republican conceptions differs 
markedly. For the liberal conception, the state is considered subordinate to a civil society for 
which it serves the function o f mediating private interests through a neutral public , 
Administration. For the republican, the state is a higher, reflective form o f substantive 
ethical life through which solidarity and political communication, uncoupled from the , 
economy, serve as the primary forms o f societal integration and steering. This for Habermas 
has consequences in terms of how each conceives o f the role o f the citizen, the law, and 
finally the political process.
The citizen for the liberal is primarily a private person whose “individual rights are 
negative rights that guarantee a domain o f freedom of choice within which legal persons are 
freed from external coercion.”30 The rights o f the republican citizen by contrast are positive 
rights to participate in a common practice o f self-definition. “The state’s raison d’itre does 
not lie primarily in the protection o f equal individual fightsbutin  the guarantee of an 
mclusmTprocesffof15pimon-'Md’̂ ^Torm attoli'm  which freellnd equal citizens reach an 
understanding on which goals and norms lie in the equal interest o f all.”31 In terms o f the 
legal order, while for the liberal individual rights are prior to discursive will formation, for 
the republican such rights owe their existence to such discourse. For Habermas, “the 
republican conception at least points in the direction o f a concept o f law that accords equal 
weight to both the integrity o f the individual and the integrity o f the community in which 
persons as both individuals and members can first accord one another reciprocal
30 Habermas. “Three Normative Models o f Democracy,” p. 241
31 Ibid.
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recognition.”32 Finally, while for the liberal the political process is conceived in primarily 
strategic terms in the competition for administrative power, for the republican the logic of 
the political process is governed by “the obstinate structures o f a public communication 
oriented to mutual understanding.”33 While these positions are ones Habermas is ascribing 
to the republican conception, it is language elsewhere, perhaps verbatim, that he often uses 
to articulate his own position.
The emphasis on public communication, however, for Habermas does not come at 
the expense o f individual rights. The liberal criticism o f deliberative democracy then 
confuses deliberative democracy strictly with a republican or agonistic scheme. Habermas 
though argues for the co-originary status o f public and private autonomy. A fair public 
dialogue among free and equal participants requires the integrity o f those individual 
participants, and thus an institutionalization o f deliberative democratic principles requires a 
system o f individual rights. Rights conceived by deliberative democracy, furthermore, are 
more tightly integrated with the democratic polity than under a liberal notion. Rather than 
being the result o f some pre-established fact as per liberalism, rights are not only the 
condition o f democratic discourse but through the interpretation in deliberative procedures 
take a more articulate form, become reaffirmed by the polity, and gain further democratic 
legitimation.
Still, some confusion on the part o f liberal critics may have been generated in part by 
the fact that Habermas seems to side tentatively more with the republican than liberal 
conceptions at a normative level. What is unclear is whether Habermas is ascribing to the 
republican conception an understanding o f the interdependence o f public and private 
autonomy he denies to it elsewhere or whether — contrary to Habermas’ expressed
32 Ibid., p. 242
25
intentions — there is implicit in his own theory a certain priority o f public autonomy, 
stemming from his earlier work in discourse ethics. Whatever privilege Habermas gives to 
individual rights is primarily a matter of exercising these rights not in civil society but in the 
political sphere. While rights in the civil sphere above and beyond those needed to 
participate as free and equal individuals in the public sphere may be legitimated by public 
discourse, they have only a derivative and not co-originary status. In a certain sense it is 
private political autonomy.
Habermas still attempts to distinguish himself from the republican conception. “It 
makes the democratic process dependent on the virtues o f citizens devoted to the public 
weal For politics is not concerned in the first place with questions of ethical self- 
understanding. The mistake o f the republican view consists in an ethical foreshortening of 
political discourse.”34 At the same time, while not submitting all political discourse to this 
conception, on basic questions of political discourse, not to mention the legitimation o f the 
democratic process itself, Habermas seems to side on these normative fundamentals squarely 
in the republican camp with their priority on public autonomy.
The issue that Habermas does take with the republican conception’s ethical burden, 
however, becomes one o f the primary determinants for his model o f what institutional form 
democracy must take.
Under conditions o f  cultural and social pluralism, behind relevant goals there often lie 
interests and value-orientations that are by no means constitutive o f  the identity o f  the 
political community as a whole, that is, for the totality o f  an intersubjectively shared form o f  
life. These interests and value-orientations, which conflict with one another within the same 
polity without any prospect o f  consensual resolution, need to be counterbalanced in a way 
that cannot be effected by ethical discourse, even though the results o f  this nondiscursive 
counterbalancing are subject to the proviso that they must not violate the basic values o f  a
33 Ibid., p. 243
34 Ibid., p. 244
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culture. The balancing o f  interests takes the form o f  reaching a compromise between parties
who rely on their power and ability to sanction.35
Certainly Habermas here is no anti-institutionalist. In fact, he criticizes the republican 
conception for a certain political naivete, particularly under modem conditions of pluralism. 
The fact o f pluralism is most certainly something that any contemporary political philosophy 
must confront, lest it backslide into wistful and ultimately irrelevant pining for ethical 
homogeneity. The single, reflexive institution of the state o f a singular ethical life in the 
republican conception on the deliberative model is replaced by a plurality o f modes of 
association.
What seems surprising though, given the basic normative commitments he 
previously outlined, is how suddenly and completely, beyond the civil public sphere, 
Habermas accepts the basic liberal institutional structure o f bureaucratic administration, 
elections, and a market economy as the only possible institutional means with which to 
confront the fact o f pluralism democratically. “The sole presupposition is a public 
administration o f the kind that emerged in the early modem period together with the 
European state system and in functional interconnection with a capitalist economic 
system.”36 The ethical foreshortening o f political discourse by the republican conception 
leads for Habermas to a liberal foreshortening of political discourse about basic institutional 
arrangements for a democratic society, for in attempting to accommodate an ethical 
pluralism that republicanism cannot tolerate, Habermas is led into assuming a liberal 
institutional structure that may not in turn be able to accommodate the vibrant individual 
political participation of a republicanism he attempts to sublate into his own conception of 
deliberative democracy . Can such an arrangement really preserve the “radical democratic
35 Ibid., pp. 244-5
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m e a n in g  of a society that organizes itself through the communicatively united citizens” that 
Habermas endorses?
Habermas attempts to mediate his commitments to popular sovereignty and liberal 
institutions by adding to the liberal scheme a civil public sphere that through various 
channels and sluices influences the public debate within the political sphere outside o f the 
election cycle. The direct participation of the republican model is replaced by various levels 
in the public sphere which ‘filter’ participation in discursive opinion and will formation.
It is through the interlocking set o f  these multiple forms o f  associations, networks, and 
organizations that an anonymous “public conversation” results. It is central to the model o f  
deliberative democracy that it privileges such a public sphere o f  interlocking and overlapping 
networks and associations o f  deliberation, contestation, and argumentation. The fiction o f  a 
general deliberative assembly in which the united people expressed their will belongs to the 
early history o f  democratic theory; today our guiding model has to be that o f  a medium o f  
loosely associated, multiple foci o f  opinion formation and dissemination, which affect one 
another in free and spontaneous processes o f  communication.37
It is in view o f the public sphere and its indirect influence on political debate that the 
addressees o f the law are meant to see themselves at the same time as participating in its 
legislation. The public sphere’s sluices are also meant to be the means by which money and 
administrative power are balanced by solidarity as forms of social steering.
It is highly questionable, however, to what extent Habermas’ schema can be 
considered an adequate balance, and thus to what extent public autonomy as a conception o f 
free and equal participants in legislation can be done justice to, under such a schema. In such 
a conception, solidarity is by no means an equal partner to money and power. While the 
latter two act directly on civil society, solidarity through the public sphere only pressures the 
political debate concerning the use o f administrative sanction, and thus acts only indirectly.
36 Ibid., pp. 246-7
j7 Seyla Benhabib. “Toward a Deliberative M odel o f  Democratic Legitimacy,” pp. 73-74
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Only the political system can ‘a c t’ It is a subsystem specialized for collectively binding 
decisions, whereas the communicative structures o f  the public sphere comprise a far-flung 
network o f  sensors that respond to the pressure o f  society-wide problems and stimulate 
influential opinions. The public opinion which is worked up via democratic procedures 
cannot itself ‘rule’ but can only channel the use o f  administrative power in certain 
directions.38
Even if this is true, Habermas hardly argues that this is a limit to society as such rather than 
an historical limitation o f our present institutional arrangements. Is the relative muscle of 
the political subsystem a feature o f politics as such, or rather a feature o f bureaucratized 
political subsystems operating in conjunction with a privatized civil sphere and market 
economy?
While considering the indirect influence of solidarity on the administrative use of 
power and thus solidarity’s indirect influence on economic power, Habermas fails to 
thematize the influence o f administrative power and money on the processes of discursive 
will formation and, in particular, to what extent sluices are undergirded or steered by the very 
uses of administrative and economic power they are supposed to counterbalance. 
Furthermore, while considering the relation of political discourse to a widely dispersed, 
organized, and energized public in terms o f sluices and channels o f influence, Habermas fails 
to adequately consider the filters and sluices through which topics o f debate enter the 
influential level of political discourse. The influence o f money and power on these filters is 
especially pernicious precisely because it is far less likely to be seen as an exercise o f money 
or power since the concerns are less articulated and the debate less visible. The more 
subterranean the level of discourse the more difficult it is for the procedures o f discourse 
themselves to become articulated and receive a public airing. The exclusion o f marginalized 
individuals or groups by contrast is at the same time an exclusion of their claims of exclusion.
38 Habermas. “Three Normative Models o f Democracy,” p. 250
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The issue then is not simply that with money or power a Rupert Murdoch has a 
competitive advantage to set the agenda o f public policy (not even direct participation could 
as it were give everyone their ‘fifteen minutes’); rather it is the degree to which social 
marginalisation denies a full and fair hearing to claims about the rules and procedures by 
which the public and political discourse proceeds, considerations among which would surely 
be the influence o f money and power in setting the political agenda. If  one cannot receive 
due consideration of their claim to be excluded from public discourse because of his or her 
marginalised social position, then this is a violation o f public autonomy because it is a 
procedural exclusion. Such an individual is not simply losing a batde in the war o f ideas but 
is excluded from the full exercise o f his or her public autonomy in the basic normative 
political discourse about constitutional fundamentals, including discourse about the very 
exercise o f public autonomy.39 Since the “private autonomy of equally entided citizens can 
be secured only insofar as citizens actively exercise their civic autonomy,” such individuals’ 
private autonomy also cannot be guaranteed.
Certainly Habermas is no simple apologist for the status quo as his theory certainly 
emphasizes the participation o f those that the status quo largely excludes. What is unclear is 
what institutional means Habermas has to respond to these sorts o f objections. O f 
particular concern may be the exclusion not just of participation as such but the operations 
o f power on the logic o f the criteria by which discourses are settied and the ‘force o f the 
better argument’ decided. With Foucault one might wonder whether even within a 
“panoptical” society, the conditions o f an ideal speech situation might not be fulfilled, and 
whether Habermas ultimately has adequately addressed the potential for systematic 
discursive distortions within the public sphere.
39 These concerns are only amplified for those social actors whose potential claims have yet to be articulated in
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For Habermas, at either a normative or institutional level, public and private 
autonomy presuppose one another. Similarly, both republicanism and liberalism prove 
inadequate as a foundation for both democratic theory and practice in so far as each 
privileges one pole o f the relation at the expense o f the other. Habermas’ theory, however, 
is less smoothly integrated than Habermas himself pictures it, especially when his attempt to 
integrate public and private autonomy at the normative and theoretical level proceeds to the 
institutional level. While claiming a co-originary status for both public and private 
autonomy, the strong and emphatic normative characterization Habermas wants to give the 
deliberative democracy model (stemming from discourse ethics) emphasizes public 
autonomy in his normative foundations, giving this theoretical level a certain republican cast. 
In responding to liberal and realist concerns, at the level o f articulating appropriate 
democratic institutions, by contrast, Habermas largely follows a liberal model. This is a 
tension that Habermas’ account o f the public sphere and its sluices o f solidaristic power 
does not resolve, and rather than sublating the republican and liberal moments Habermas is 
left splitting the difference. While attempting to bridge this tension in the institutionalization 
o f solidarity through the public sphere and its sluices, Habermas’ own undertheorization of 
the relation between forms of social power leaves his conception in danger o f becoming a 
democratically normative gloss on the prevailing institutionalization o f private autonomy, 
and thus by Habermas’ own standard o f interdependence, an inadequate conception o f 
private autonomy as well. The account o f deliberative democracy then, even in terms o f its 
own normative, ‘radical democratic’ ambitions, floats somewhere between an anemic 
republicanism and only slighdy more robust liberalism.
even a subterranean level o f  the public sphere.
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, 2.2 Democratic Deficits in Benhabib
Although she took the communicative turn in critical theory, with Habermas, Seyla 
Benhabib was highly critical o f his neo-Kantian formulation o f discourse ethics. She has 
become significantly less critical o f Habermas after having followed him in the turn to
I
deliberative democracy. Foremost for both thinkers has been a defense of practical 
rationality in the public realm stemming from principles derived from discourse ethics. “The 
approach I follow is consonant with what John Rawls has called ‘Kantian constructivism’ 
and what Jurgen Habermas refers to as ‘reconstruction.’ In .this context, the differences in 
methodology are less significant than their shared assumptions that the institutions o f liberal 
democracies embody the idealized content o f  a form of practical reason.”40 Contra Rawls 
but with Habermas she characterizes this form of practical reasons in terms o f a civil public
t
' sphere.
I •
Such processes have a claim to rationality because they increase and make available necessary 
information, because they allow the expression of arguments in light o f which opinions and 
beliefs need to be revised, and because they lead to the formulation o f conclusions that can
 ---------  ~be~challenged publicly tor good reasons . : .  TEFcKief lnsfimtibnifcorrekte^bf^sucEamodel-
o f deliberative democracy is a m ultiple, anonymous, heterogeneous netw ork o f many publics 
and private conversations.41
As I have argued previously, however, there are good reasons to believe that Habermas has 
failed in his articulation o f the public sphere as a means to do justice to those discourse 
theoretic normative principles in complex, modem societies. Does Benhabib’s reformulated 
orientation in discourse ethics then blunt the criticisms elucidated above against Habermas, 
since those criticisms took aim primarily at the Kantian orientation of his work?
40 Seyla Benhabib. “Toward a Deliberative Model o f Democratic Legitimacy,” p. 68
41 Ibid., p. 87
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While continuing to operate in the paradigm o f communicative ethics, Benhabib’s 
version has had a different orientation from the start. Benhabib rejected Habermas’ neo- 
Kantian transcendental justification o f discourse ethics on self-consciously Hegelian 
grounds. This had the further consequence of rejecting Habermas’ strict distinction between 
moral and ethical discourses, which led Benhabib to posit a complementary sphere of 
solidarity and needs to that o f rights. In Benhabib’s move to deliberative democracy, while 
the shared assumption o f practical reason with figures like Rawls and Habermas takes on an 
increasingly Kantian character, its grounding remains Hegelian.
This form o f  practical reason has become the collective and anonymous property o f  
cultures, institutions, and traditions as the result o f  the experiments and experiences, both 
ancient and modem, with democratic rule over the course o f  human history. . .  When one 
thinks through the form o f  practical rationality at the core o f  democratic rule, Hegel’s 
concept o f  ‘objective Spirit’ (objektiver Geisl) appears to m e particularly appropriate . . .  
without [the] metaphor o f  the subject implicitly governing it, the term ‘objective spirit’ would 
refer to those anonymous ye t intelligible collective rules, procedures, and practices that form a 
way o f  life.42
While Habermas himself has largely abandoned in deliberative democracy the project of 
transcendentalist justifications in favor o f an appeal to the historically situated requirements 
of a post-metaphysical modernity, a Kantian legacy still tuns strongly through much of his 
work: the differentiation o f value spheres, a legal focus, and a statist orientation. These 
orientations, I have argued previously, contribute significantly to the tensions in Habermas’ 
conception o f deliberative democracy. While abandoning the supersubject o f Hegel and its 
instantiation in the state as the highest form of ethical life, Benhabib has maintained, in her 
move to deliberative democracy, an interest in the dialectic between justice and ethical self­
definition, and an interest in a robust (though not homogenous) ethical life as a feature o f 
public life and political deliberation.
42 Ibid., p. 69
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The most concrete difference between Habermas and Benhabib in terms of 
deliberative democracy has been over what the proper object o f public sphere deliberation is. 
For Rawls the public sphere is located within the modem state. While the public sphere for 
Habermas is civil, its object primarily is the legislative bodies that control the bureaucratic 
administrative apparatuses o f the modem state. For Benhabib, much o f the work of the civil 
public sphere is on civil society itself. “Opinion-making publics, as found in social 
movements, for example, can lead us to reconsider and rethink very controversial issues 
about privacy, sexuality, and intimacy, but this does not imply that the only or even most 
desirable consequence o f such processes o f public deliberation should be general 
legislation.”43 Two other significant consequences then follow in the organization o f the 
public sphere. First, while Habermas has emphasized a multivocal, layered public sphere, 
Benhabib, in her more elaborate work on feminism, multiculturalism, and the politics of 
difference, has characterized some o f these associations, following Nancy Fraser, as ‘sub­
altern counterpublics’: spaces for minorities to articulate and argue over the distinction 
between public and private, the state and the public sphere, and layers in the public sphere 
itself. Second, Benhabib has taken a more decided interest in alternative institutional 
organization “to question seriously and investigate the institutionalpossibilities o f realizing a 
democracy centered on a procedure o f free, public deliberation.”44
Habermas’ entire political project is still rooted in the Kantian problematic o f 
attempting to mediate the addressers and addressees o f modem law. This stems from the 
assumption that in modern, complex societies the givers and receivers o f law are removed in 
the first instance, since the political system is differentiated from civil society and the 
organization o f society is assumed to proceed primarily from the political apparatus. While
43 Ibid, p. 84
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not agreeing with Marx that a true democracy entails abolishing the state, Benhabib does de­
center the state as an apparatus o f social steering, and elevates democratic discourse. The 
civil public sphere under this conception gains a certain relative autonomy; the norms 
garnered by political discourse have their own binding effect without mediation from the 
state. Even without its emphasis on the state with a higher-order reflective life, Benhabib 
comes closer to a republican conception of a self-regulating sphere o f political autonomy.
Habermas, in endorsing parliamentary politics and emphasizing the role o f the state 
as a subsystem which ‘acts,’ also structurally privileges those areas o f the public sphere from 
which the sluices that affect the political system emanate. Since the object o f public 
autonomy primarily concerns that o f the state, it also primarily concerns those regions o f the 
public sphere that have influence in deliberations within the state. The consequence is a 
conception o f public autonomy that moves steadily upwards from everyday informal 
conversations to increasingly higher levels o f organization aimed at public policy. In 
essence, Habermas, in setting up the problematic of modem sovereignty in terms o f those 
who make the law and those who receive it, fails in the addition of his conception o f a civil 
public sphere to articulate a real community of free and equal participants. Vast segments of 
the population do not exercise their political autonomy any more robustly than they would 
in a liberal electoral system, which is in no small part why Benhabib takes issue with 
Habermas’ account.
Benhabib de-centers the state as an essential mediator o f social power. When the 
issue is reformulated then not as an issue o f law but o f prevailing norms, the tension is 
formulated not just between a legal system and a populace but between a civil public sphere 
and a civil society. The distance between the addressers and addressees o f social norms is
44 Ibid., p. 85
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significantly reduced. The idea that we are at once makers and subjects o f the ‘law’ gains 
increasing plausibility to the extent that it is the effect o f free and equal discourse rather than 
the product of filtered discourses upon a system with its own internal logic, though capable 
o f permeation by democratic discourses.
So while Habermas endorses a differentiated public sphere, the movement in a sense 
always extends upwards. Simultaneously, however, the reflexive moment in discourse ethics 
is institutionalized upwards, and so thus, at the level where it matters and at which public 
autonomy is actually exercised, the capability to enter into second-order dialogue about the 
rules o f procedure and claims o f exclusion is adjudicated at higher-order levels o f the public 
sphere. Tongue-in cheek, this can be referred to as the ‘David Horowitz effect’, in which 
only those positions already backed by money and power are able to make the claim of 
exclusion in an ‘official’ discourse.45 The risk then is an exclusion o f claims o f exclusion by 
those members o f the democratic polity who are, in fact, lacking the recognition o f moneyed 
and powered interests.
It is to address such problems that Benhabib endorses the notion of a 
heterogeneous, dispersed network o f ‘sub-altem counter-publics.’
Subaltern Counterpublic Theory . . .  proposes that marginalized groups, including Hispanics, 
are restricted in the general Public by dominant structures in academic and political 
institutions. The best means o f  combating this restriction is the development o f  
Counterpublics, spaces in which the marginalized groups becomes the homogenous 
majority. Within these Counterpublics, the marginalized group is able to introduce, 
deliberate, circulate, and perfect thoughts, actions and strategies, without the restrictions or 
limitations imposed by dominant structures. These new  thoughts and actions might then be 
brought to the larger Public for further circulation and deliberation.46
45 David Horowitz is a conservative pundit whose organization focuses on highlighting alleged liberal 
biases in the media and academia. His various political stunts only filter through the public sphere on 
account o f a well-financed organization with powerful connections in the media and politics, thus making 
his claims o f muzzling and censorship at the very least, deeply ironic.
46 Miguel Figueroa & Annabelle Nunez. (2003, April). Materials, Models and Margins: On the 
Vicissitudes o f Archiving Identity and Community, Presentation at the Sixth Institute o f the Trejo Foster 
Foundation for Hispanic Library Education, Los Angeles CA.
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Counter-publics, operating in the broader civil public sphere, follow the logic of an 
oppositional party at the parliamentary level, increasing the rationality o f public discourse by 
raising the level o f general information and countering generally popular assumptions with 
public arguments. The particular importance o f ‘sub-altem’ public spheres, as contrasted 
from other civil associations, is to provide an arena to highlight and contest the 
public/private distinction. For Habermas, solidarity coagulates at those levels o f the public 
sphere emphasizing general legislation, as do the steering mechanisms o f money and power. 
Benhabib instead emphasizes the importance o f counter-publics negotiating the intricacies 
o f such issues. Such counter-publics, operating as a counterweight, become the bases of 
operations from which claims of exclusion from the general public sphere can be made, 
which would otherwise be adjudicated on the terms o f the dominant public discourse.
If Habermas, perhaps even against his own best intentions, becomes a conservative 
in terms of democratic civil institutions in the public sphere, it is because he thinks that in 
complex, modem societies bureaucratic public administrations and market capitalism are 
givens. Because solidarity ‘acts’ only through public administration, the internal organization 
o f associations in the public sphere becomes dominated by their attempt to influence 
bureaucratic public policy, by either lobbying the state more directly or by the ability to 
create a popular sense o f crisis among the citizenry. For Benhabib, it is precisely when the 
uninstitutionalized everyday discourses and the norms emanating from them become the 
object of political action that the effect o f such discourses becomes more nebulous and 
immeasurable, if only because the consequences are less intended as instrumental effects 
than as mutual understandings.
Freed from the singular political objective o f influencing bureaucratic public policy, 
associations in the public sphere are now given the opportunity to extend the participation
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of citizens generally excluded from political discourse. The deliberative democratic ideal o f 
self-governance is increasingly made possible by the communicative progress o f institutional 
design. Benhabib attempts to open the door to a real balance of solidarity as a social steering 
mechanism with bureaucratic administration and money in two ways: first by opening the 
doors to participation in the broader normative governance o f society by associations not 
directly mediated by the state, and, second, by opening participation in such institutions to 
broader segments o f society, aided in due part by the demand of inclusion by ‘sub-altem 
counter-publics.’
In terms o f a more self-regulating public sphere and an emphasis on sub-altem 
counter-publics, Benhabib has worked to alleviate some o f the democratic deficits in 
Habermas’ conception. Her work has continued to extend the deliberative principle beyond 
the limits posited by Habermas, in turn making those limits into more fluid boundaries. She 
has extended discourse ethics from rights to questions o f solidarity, from morality to 
questions o f ethics, and finally from law to forms o f non-legal social steering. Her focus on 
the public sphere and the institutions within it, however, may not be enough to realize ‘the 
radical meaning o f democracy’ that deliberative democracy espouses, given a remaining 
conservative trajectory concerning the relation of the public sphere to social sub-systems 
outside it. So while Benhabib’s model o f a civil public sphere is broader and more 
participatory than Habermas’, and may thus serve to strengthen solidarity as a form o f social 
steering, her relative lack o f attention to the mediations o f the civil public sphere by other 
steering mechanisms such as money and power may undermine her attempt to provide a 
more robust model o f democracy. That is to say, money and power invariably introduce 
elements o f coercion even into a more vigorous or inclusive public sphere.
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For Habermas the virtue o f the republican conception was its emphasis on “the 
obstinate structures o f  a public communication oriented to mutual understanding.”4' At the 
same tim e  it places too much o f a burden on the public weal o f citizens and contracts 
political discourse to ethics.
Under conditions o f  cultural and social pluralism, behind politically relevant goals there are 
often interests and value-orientations that are by no means constitutive o f  the identity o f  the 
political community as a whole, that is, for the totality o f  an intersubjectively shared form o f  
life. These interests and value-orientations, which conflict with one another within the same 
polity without any prospect o f  consensual resolution, need to be counterbalanced in a way 
that cannot be effected by ethical discourse . . .  the balancing o f  interests takes the form o f  
reaching a compromise between parties who rely on their power and ability to sanction.4*
Although she abandons the homogenous ethical life o f the republican conception, has 
Benhabib, in elevating such discourses to bring solidarity more in balance with money and 
power, placed too much of an unrealistic communicative burden on actors in the public 
sphere, especially under conditions o f value pluralism? Benhabib has in some sense taken 
discourses about needs and identity that occur in the republican conception o f the state and 
added them to the civil public sphere. This is not to remove ethical discourse from the 
political sphere nor is it to contract political discourses and the inevitable compromises 
issuing from governing a society o f diverse values and interests. For Benhabib, rather, what 
constitutes a legislative issue, and what burden of political participation is placed on the 
citizenry, should be decided through deliberations ranging from the civil public sphere to the 
state. Habermas, by contrast, foreshortens just these kinds o f discourses by positing the 
state simply as the privileged object o f the public sphere. The limits o f a republican 
conception under conditions o f cultural and social pluralism for Habermas are to be 
transcended by a deliberative proceduralism. Because, however, the object o f political
47 Habermas. “Three Normative Models o f Democracy,” p. 243
48 Ibid., pp. 244-5
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discourse is the state for Habermas, this proceduralism winds up tending towards forms of 
liberal, “neutral” compromise that solidify the public/private distinction.
Sub-altem counter-publics have a certain privileged place in Benhabib’s scheme in 
drawing the public/private distinction, further institutionalizing the reflexive commitments 
o f deliberative democracy in opening democratic procedures to further discussion and 
rearticulation. Benhabib’s answer to cultural and value pluralism is not then to emphasize 
deliberatively fair, liberal compromises, but further ethical reflexivity. In contrast to 
traditional republicanism, Benhabib’s model emphasizes contestation and rearticulation 
rather than articulation and affirmation. Sub-altem counter-publics give a place to minority 
voices and potential claims o f exclusion that might otherwise be silenced in Habermas’ more 
general and legally oriented public sphere. The rejection o f a univocal public sphere in 
deliberative democracy, however, while answering the charges o f naive utopianism, opens up 
the problem of a “free and equal” communication between these varying networks.
While the broader public must be complemented by counter-publics in order to be 
more truly representative, counter-publics in turn must be complemented by the broader 
public in order to be effective. In so Hr as the ethical self-definitions occurring in such 
spheres are to become universalizable justice concerns, they need the recognition o f the 
public sphere. This recognition in late capitalist societies does not proceed by recognition of 
the better argument alone. Better placed, organized, and financed groups in the public 
sphere with access to molding the operations o f bureaucratic power have a good deal o f 
ability to define who their opposition is. A difficulty detected in Habermas then reappears, 
in that claims of exclusion from unrecognized counter-publics are potentially excluded.
Oppositional groups improve the rationality o f deliberative processes by improving 
information flows and opening arguments to dispute. Such processes may be less than
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ideally rational, however, by still limiting deliberation to dominant, albeit competitive, 
parties. What needs to be interrogated is not only the relation o f counter-publics to the state 
and broader regions o f the public sphere but also tbeir relation to unformalized, everyday 
interactions and conversations. How then do conversations become associations? This is a 
particularly important question because even while the public sphere as an institution carries 
the normative weight for deliberative theorists, it is precisely these informal everyday 
interactions that for deliberative democratic theorists give the public sphere its normative 
weight, for they best capture the open-ended, participatory dialogues among unprivileged 
parties envisioned by discourse ethics. The associations emanating from these conversations 
represent the power o f  solidarity as a form of social steering.
How effectively solidarity is channeled is in one respect a matter o f institutional 
design, and Benhabib has been open to such questions in order to strengthen solidarity as a 
form o f social steering. What Benhabib rejects, however, is the attempt to formalize, or 
otherwise institutionalize, those everyday conversations that are the root o f democracy. On 
the one hand, such an attempt would be simply unworkable. O n the other hand, such a 
formalization would begin to erode just those features o f everyday conversation oriented to 
mutual understanding that align themselves so closely with discourse ethics. The danger 
though becomes a certain idealization o f informal discourse on the part of deliberative 
democracy in failing to realize the extent to which such conversations are already structured 
by social steering mechanisms like power and money — for example, in the demarcation of 
public and private zones of social intercourse, urban infrastructures, and the organization of 
work. Benhabib at one point asks explicitly a question that has been impliddy guiding much 
o f this interrogation o f deliberative democracy.
Since its inception with the Greeks the question o f  the most adequate socioeconomic order
most compatible with democratic rule has been intensely debated. Rousseau’s own wisdom
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on the matter was that only in a society in which no one was poor enough to have to sell 
himself and no one rich enough to buy another could be democratic. Since the nineteenth 
century, the question o f  the compatibility between democracy and capitalism has been on 
the agenda. For this reason the relationship between deliberative democracy and social 
complexity needs to be posed otherwise: what are the forms o f  association and modes o f  
organization, at the economic, social, cultural spheres, that bear an ‘elective affinity’ with the 
principles o f  deliberative democracy at the political sphere?49
Benhabib’s less-than-adequate answer, after articulating some general theoretical 
considerations, is to privilege new institutional possibilities in the design o f civil, political 
institutions, and she singles out environmental groups, “in which the practice o f discursive 
design enable efficiency and success through voluntary compliance, consciousness raising, 
and decentralized problem solving.”50 Such institutional considerations begin to address 
Habermas’ concern that civil public associations are not up to the task o f social steering 
without state intervention. Moreover, the question o f adequate economic, social, and 
cultural institutions must be dealt with in a democratic manner. An account o f adequately 
democratic political institutions, then, would be conceptually prior, since such institutions 
would legitimate the norms by which economic, social, and cultural institutions would be 
judged. Along with Habermas, however, what Benhabib fails to address here, is that 
achieving an adequate balance o f solidarity, money, and power in complex societies is not 
just a question of augmenting solidaristic institutions so that they can function as 
mechanisms o f social steering and thus help regulate the influences o f money and power, but 
also a question o f the influence o f money and power in the formation o f common concerns 
and political associations in the public sphere.
Similarly, the emphasis on environmental groups highlights the internal organization 
o f such associations and their impact on society without interrogating either the influence o f
49 Ibid., p. 85
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society on such organizations or how the democratic and unorganized wellspring of 
conversations oriented to mutual understanding work their way up into such organizations. 
The general social composition o f environmental groups, for instance, is well known and 
reflects the disparities in ‘assodational capital’ o f civil society more largely. The question of 
adequate socioeconomic arrangements might well be a question that can only be answered 
democratically, but it is also one whose democratic legitimacy depends on it being an inclusive 
deliberation among free and equalparticipants. This legitimacy is at risk to the extent to which 
assodational capital is dependent on cultural and economic capital. So then, while 
Habermas, in taking the existing institutionalization o f money and power for granted, is 
unable to articulate a public sphere able to do justice to his normative commitments, it is 
unclear whether Benhabib in articulating a more robust civil public sphere more consonant 
with the prindples o f deliberative democracy still fails to adequately relate such a conception 
to the mediations o f social subsystems. Benhabib’s most explicit treatment to date o f the 
question o f the relation o f deliberative democracy to economic considerations occurs in the 
context of The Claims of Culture, particularly in the context o f the political and philosophical 
debate over recognitive and redistributive paradigms o f justice. Benhabib self-consciously 
owes her own formulation o f the problematic to Nancy Fraser. The framework that she 
adopts from Fraser in order to accommodate economic concerns, I will argue in the next 
sub-section, ultimately belies her own deliberative democratic framework.
50 Ibid., p. 87
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2.3 Fraser and Benhabib on Recognition and Redistribution
t
Fraser sets up her interrogation in the historical context o f what she terms the 
“postsocialist condition.”
The ‘postsocialist condition’ concerns a shift in the grammar of political claims-making. 1 
Claims for the recognition of group difference have become increasingly salient in the recent 
period, at times eclipsing claims for social equality. Ibis phenomenon can be observed at 
two levels. Empirically, o f course, we have seen the rise of ‘identity politics,’ the decentering 
of class, and, until very recently, the corresponding decline of social democracy. More 
deeply, however, we are witnessing an apparent shift in the political imaginary, especially in 
the way in which justice is imagined . . .  The result is a decoupling of cultural politics from 
social politics and the relative eclipse of the latter by the former.51
Fraser’s work is by no means an apologia for the old class politics. She recognizes that there 
are dimensions o f injustice that cannot be reduced to class or remedied simply by 
redistributive measures. She notes equally, however, that identity politics emerges in an 
historical context of economic globalization and increasing socio-economic inequality, and 
that the emphasis on recognition carries with it certain political dangers. To the extent to 
which it displaces concerns about economic redistribution, it can help to exacerbate sodo- 
- economic inequality. The politics o f cultural identity as well can easily slip into a reification 
of group identities, undermining individual autonomy and sanctioning intra-group 
domination in the form o f gender inequalities or the silencing o f minority dissent. Thus, 
Fraser argues, it is crucial to conceive o f injustice as having both redistributive and 
recognitive dimensions that are intertwined and interdependent
Redistribution is a familiar concept from liberal political philosophy. “The term 
‘recognition,’ by contrast, comes from Hegelian philosophy, specifically the phenomenology 
of consdousness. In this tradition, recognition designates an ideal redprocal relation 
between subjects in which each sees the other as its equal and also as separate from it. This
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relation is deemed constitutive for subjectivity; one becomes an individual only in virtue of 
recognizing, and being recognized by, another subject”52 The interdependency of the 
redistributive and recognitive paradigms o f justice leads to a particular dilemma for Fraser. 
Injustices in each paradigm reinforce one another and become a vicious circle. 
Discriminatory cultural n o rm s become socio-economic institutions, apartheid perhaps being 
the most egregious example. Socio-economic inequalities impede participation in social 
institutions that generate cultural codes, leading to inadequate recognition of minority 
identities. For Fraser, however, the crux of the dilemma is that while injustices in the 
redistributive and recognitive paradigms reinforce each other, the remedies for such 
injustices seem to be at odds. Redistribution seems to undermine group differentiations; to 
accede to working-class demands is in essence to put them out o f business as a group. 
Demands for remedies to a lack of recognition, however, generally seek the valorization of 
formerly despised identities, such as homosexuals; such remedies thus support or reinforce 
group differentiation.
The redistributive-recognitive dilemma may seem, however, only to be a conceptual 
one in so far as that, for practical purposes, remedies in each paradigm can be separated in 
targeting specific groups. For instance, the answer to the problem of the working class is 
primarily redistributive. The group needs to be de-differentiated, not recognized. Similarly, 
the answer to injustices perpetrated against gays is primarily recognitive. Homosexuals do 
not need redistribution primarily; they need increased valorization o f their sexual orientation. 
This conceptual dilemma becomes politically relevant, however, when we start ta lk in g  about 
‘bivalent collectivities.’ For bivalent collectivities, o f which gender and race are Fraser’s
51 Nancy Fraser. Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the “Postsocialist ” Condition, (New York: 
Routledge Press, 1997), p. 2
52 Ibid., p. 10
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prime examples, injustice has roots both in the division of labor and hierarchal cultural 
codings. “Two-dimensionally subordinated groups suffer both maldistribution and 
misrecognition in forms where neither of these injustices is an indirect effect of the other, but where both are 
primary and co-otiginal.”5y Rather than decoupling cultural from social justice and classifying 
groups accordingly, Fraser proposes locating groups on a continuum between tbe varying 
poles o f  redistribution and recognition. Groups like the working class and homosexuals lean 
towards the redistributive and recognitive poles respectively, while bivalent collectivities are 
placed more towards the middle.
It is in terms o f  bivalent collectivities that the redistributive-recognitive dilemma is 
most apparent. While recognitive and redistributive injustices tend to reinforce one another, 
attempts at remedying these injustices can have ambivalent consequences. Recognitive 
remedies can lead to exacerbating distributive inequalities. “Proposals to redress androcentric 
evaluative patterns, for example, have economic implications, which can work to the 
detriment o f the intended beneficiaries. For example, campaigns to suppress prostitution 
and pornography for the sake o f enhancing women’s status may have negative effects on the 
economic position of sex workers.”54 Redistributive remedies can likewise exacerbate 
misrecognition. “Means-tested benefits aimed specifically at the poor are the most direcdy 
redistributive form of social welfare. Yet such benefits tend to stigmatize recipients, casting 
them as deviants and scroungers and invidiously distinguishing tbem from ‘wage-eamers’ 
and ‘taxpayers’ who ‘pay their own way.’”55 Crucial to Fraser’s conception of the dilemma of 
redistribution and recognition is the key role that increasing group differentiation plays. It is 
not surprising then the extent to which Fraser emphasizes group de-differentiation as a
53 Ibid., p. 19
54 Ibid., p. 65
55 Ibid., pp. 64-5
46
solution to this apparent dilemma. Fraser’s conception of de-differentiation, however, is not 
one of the assimilation of minorities or liberal neutrality, but of active political intervention 
in overcoming hierarchies and undermining cultural binaries. In addition to overcoming the 
potential pitfalls o f cultural stigmatization and economic ghettoization, group de­
differentiation holds open the possibility o f building larger collective solidarities across 
groups, which resonates with Benhabib’s overall project. After discussing Benhabib’s 
relation to Fraser’s contemporary work, I will return to the question as to what Fraser’s 
conception o f active political intervention ultimately entails.
Benhabib’s most recent work centers on the attempt to accommodate the concerns 
o f multiculturalism within a deliberative democratic framework. She contrasts this approach 
with the politics o f identity.
The emphasis as well as the ordering o f  our principles are different. Most democratic 
theorists welcome and support struggles for recognition and identity/difference movements 
to the degree to which they are movements for democratic inclusion, greater social and 
political justice, and cultural fluidity. But movements for maintaining  the purity or 
distinctiveness o f  cultures seem to m e irreconcilable with both democratic and more basic 
epistemological considerations. Philosophically, I do not believe in the purity o f  cultures, or 
even in the possibility o f  identifying them as meaningful discrete wholes. I think o f  cultures 
as complex human practices o f  signification and representation, o f  organization and 
attribution, which are internally riven by conflicting narratives.56
In the Claims of Culture Benhabib cites Fraser’s work for three particularly notable reasons. 
First, Fraser has added to the debate over recognition empirical content and sociological 
dynamics, “which had been missing in rather vague references to acknowledgement o f the 
other, self-realization, self-affirmation, and the like.”57 Second, Fraser has emphasized the 
particular interdependence o f redistribution and recognition. Third, and most importantly 
for Benhabib, Fraser is suspicious o f identity politics and she supports a politics o f cultural
56 Benhabib. The Claim s o f  Culture, p. ix
57 Ibid., p. 69
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dialogue over that of preservation. In fact, part o f what Benhabib aims to do in The Claims of 
Culture is to “expand Fraser’s framework in a more historical and institutional direction.”58 
Benhabib’s “expansion of Fraser’s framework” becomes clearer when viewed 
through the lens o f her example concerning the allocation of distributive benefits in the 
United States. Benefit programs in the United States are divided between those that are 
universalistic in scope, such as social security, and those that are often more particularistic in 
scope, such as housing and educational subsidies. Given Benhabib’s endorsement o f Fraser, 
it is not surprising that she is suspicious o f these more particularistic benefits. Instead, she 
endorses a more universalistic perspective in the distribution of benefits, in particular raising 
the minimum wage.
It would undoubtedly affect wotkets who ate members o f  minority cultural groups — like 
blacks, Hispanics, and Asian immigrants — perhaps more disproportionately than it would 
white workers; but since everyone who looks for a job or who becomes unemployed can 
potentially face a minimum-wage job one day, there would be greater societal solidarity for 
such a measure than for job programs targeted at specific minority groups only.”59
In Benhabib’s emphasis on group de-differentiation and cultural dialogues, her extension of 
Fraser is at first seemingly apt. In her own empirical policy proposals, Fraser has emphasized 
a more universalistic scheme in redistribution and a more “deconstructive” approach in 
cultural politics. Benhabib’s expansion o f Fraser, however, misses a conceptual distinction 
that is crucial to Fraser’s own analysis, one that actually makes Benhabib’s position closer to 
that of Habermas’ more democratically porous welfare state than Fraser’s own position.
This distinction is between that o f affirmative and transformative solutions.
Affirmative solutions for Fraser aim at altering outcomes. Transformative solutions 
aim at altering the underlying structures that produce such outcomes. The distinction is 
crucial to Fraser’s analysis because of the role it plays in the recognitive-redistributive
58 Ibid., p. 71
59 Ibid., p. 76
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d ilem m a . The ambivalences in remedies to injustice result from affirmative solutions. This 
is because they solidify group differentiation. “When applied to misrecognition, affirmative 
remedies tend to reify group identities. Valorizing group identity along a single axis, they 
drastically simplify people’s self-understandings . . .  such approaches tend to pressure 
individuals to conform to the group type . . .  applied to maldistribution, they often provoke a 
backlash o f misrecognition.”60 Transformative solutions, by contrast, tend to undermine 
group differentiation and hold up the potential for intergroup solidarity.
In the recognitive paradigm, affirmative solutions valorize the subordinated term in 
a binary such as masculine/feminine while transformative solutions attempt to undermine 
the hierarchy and dichotomy. “This second approach would redress status subordination by 
deconstructing the symbolic oppositions that underlie currently institutionalized patterns of 
cultural value. Far from simply raising the self-esteem o f the misrecognized, it would 
destabilize existing status differentiation and change everyone's self-identity”61 Fraser gives 
queer theory as an example o f a transformative solution that, rather than seeking to codify 
and valorize a gay identity, questions the stability o f sexual orientation in general and seeks a 
continuum of fluid, shifting difference in self (ascribed)-identities. Such continuums 
undermine monolithic conceptions of groups altogether, thus alleviating the stigmatizations 
o f groups that result in misrecognition. To this extent, Benhabib implicitly endorses a 
transformative model o f recognition.
In the redistributive paradigm, however, Fraser identifies the welfare state as the 
affirmative solution and socialism as the transformative solution, while Benhabib herself 
continues to operate within the contours o f the welfare state. Contemporary politics aiming 
at social justice is defined for Fraser by affirmative solutions in both paradigms, leading to
60 Nancy Fraser. Redistribution or Recognition?, p. 76
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what Fraser calls “identity politics liberalism.” A transformative account in both paradigms, 
and one Fraser thinks is necessary to overcome the redistributive/recognitive dilem m a 
would be a “deconstructive socialism.” Benhabib, according to this schema, occupies the 
unusual position o f “deconstructive liberalism.” I f  Fraser is right about how deeply 
intertwined recognition and redistribution are, however, then there is reason to question the 
potential coherence o f Benhabib’s account, and whether it can ultimately deliver the sort of 
increased democratic inclusion she wants from the account
Would an increase in the minimum wage, then, really make a significant difference in 
recognitive and redistributive justice? Would it lead to more general social solidarity? 
Certainly it would alleviate some economic injustice and relieve some kinds o f specific social 
stigmatization that are associated with benefit programs targeted at specific groups. Most 
prominently perhaps, it would alleviate the politics between minority groups over scarce 
benefits that can tend to produce reified political blocs. That is to say, it holds real potential 
to increase the social solidarity between rival minority groups and among the economically 
disadvantaged more generally. But while it is ultimately an empirical question, the 
assumption Benhabib makes that grounds her societal solidarity thesis, namely that everyone 
who works is confronted with the possibility o f minimum wage work, I find somewhat 
dubious. Sociologically, I suspect that the upper strata o f American society do not actually 
confront minimum wage work; the percentage that do not psychologically confront the 
possibility -  in a largely optimistic population that emphasizes upward social mobility — I 
would hypothesize is probably even larger. So the raise in the m inim um  wage, while raising 
the bar, and potentially increasing the solidarity o f those beneath it, is unlikely to make that 
bar much more fluid. In terms o f associational capital — money, time, and social connections
61 Ibid., p. 75
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— the bottom strata remain relatively disadvantaged, and so it hard to see how large inroads 
in democratic inclusion are being made here. A t best, large gains would be more likely to 
result intergenerationally than intragenerationally, and these perhaps made more in terms of 
individual social mobility than general social equality and participation. It also unclear what 
effect such a redistributive schema would have on recognitive injustices. While 
compensations are more equalized, “demeaning” kinds o f work and those populations 
generally subject to it are left in place. Such populations are likely to remain stigmatized. 
More generally, while Benhabib’s scheme aims to de-differentiate and transform minorities, 
it still tends to affirm the majority, questioning neither the relative economic hierarchy nor 
privileged identities. The burden o f democratic inclusion, then, in terms o f political 
participation and cultural fluidity, is ironically placed largely on the excluded. Deconstructive 
liberalism, then, turns out to be far more liberal than deconstructive, and thus much more 
affirmative than transformative.
Deconstructive socialism, however, is no less problematic. Fraser is unable to give 
an institutional account o f socialism. In the wake o f “really existing socialism” grave worries 
abound as to whether such an account can be given. Moreover, a political constituency for 
socialism seems to be lacking. But is there really any more o f a political constituency for 
deconstruction? Both, as Fraser recognizes, are experientially remote from the concerns of 
victims o f both misrecognition and maldistribution. “More generally, transformative 
strategies are highly vulnerable to collective action problems. In their pure form, at least, 
they become feasible only under unusual circumstances, when events conspire to wean many 
people simultaneously from current constructions o f their interests and identities.”62 While 
lacking the more substantial gains in democratic participation that in principle socialism would
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foster, Benhabib’s politically practicable deconstructive liberalism would at least alleviate some 
injustices, while avoiding the particularly pernicious ambivalences o f remedial accounts 
emphasizing group differentiation. In the “postsocialist” condition, is not this a better 
strategy than a conceptually unproblematic political impotence?
The dilemma of affirmative and transformative strategies for Fraser though is no 
more intractable than that between the recognitive and redistributive paradigms. What is 
needed are affirmative and transformative strategies that reinforce one another. “Reforms 
that appear affirmative in the abstract can have transformative effects in some contexts, 
provided they are radically and consistently pursued.”63 Fraser terms such strategies “non­
reformist reform.” Strategically, this means that outcome-oriented shifts alleviating injustice 
are pursued in the short run that at the same time alter the balance o f power in such a 
fashion that over the long term the prognosis o f transformative solutions improves. The 
primary example that Fraser gives o f non-reformist reform is that o f the Unconditional Basic 
Income.
At first glance, such a proposal might seem substantially similar to Benhabib’s 
proposal for an increase in the minimum wage. In the short term, both are affirmative 
solutions that raise the bar on the most unfortunate. The potential long-term consequences 
are, however, miles apart; an Unconditional Basic Income can alter the underlying social 
structures in a way that the minimum wage does not, in that it redistributes not only income 
but bargaining power in the general conflict between capital and labor, removing the 
traditional advantage o f surplus labor that the capitalist has in wage negotiations. Under the 
Unconditional Basic Income, there would no longer be an imperative to enter the labor
62 Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth. Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange, 
(New York: Verso, 2003), p.78
63 Ibid.
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market. This would not only be an incentive to raise wages, since basic needs could be met
I
alternatively, but an incentive to change the nature o f labor in order attract workers.
Recognitively, an Unconditional Basic Income blurs the status bar in two directions. 
By not only pressuring changes in remuneration but in the structure o f  work -  for instance 
by increasing self-determination and flexibility — the Unconditional Basic Income could blur 
Jbe boundaries between previously high status and low status work for a previously lower 
strata of workers. Similarly, such a policy would not only encourage a previously lower strata 
o f workers to “tune in,” it would encourage a previously higher strata o f workers to “drop 
out” and pursue alternative forms o f self-identity. The boundaries o f social and economic 
status, which a minimum wage proposal would leave largely intact, could become blurred 
under a radically and consistently pursued policy o f Unconditional Basic Income. The 
consequences o f this are not only redistributive and recognitive, but participatory as well.
The private-public distinction in Habermas and Benhabib, while formally a continuing topic 
o f debate in the civil public sphere, endorses existing liberal capitalism and the welfare state, 
thus largely allowing capital to define the boundary by allowing it to structure both the 
nature o f work and leisure. Proposals such as the Unconditional Basic Income, by contrast, 
provide the material conditions under which such democratic deliberations about the 
boundaries o f public and private, as well as about cultural codings and schemes of 
distribution, could become efficacious.
2.4 Concluding Reflections
While giving solidarity and practical reason an eminent position in discourse, 
Habermas hedges on its role in the social regulation of action. “The public opinion which is
53
worked up via democratic procedures cannot itself ‘rule’ but can only channel the use o f 
administrative power in specific directions.”64 With Benhabib we may counter that this 
should not be for the theoretician but the participants themselves to decide. But Benhabib 
perhaps overestimates the current institutionalization o f rational dialogue and the 
commitments o f  social actors to it to a degree that may not justify her emphasis on cultural 
dialogues over judicial actions, even given Benhabib’s relative consideration o f alternative 
institutional designs. But this is a social fact, not a natural property o f practical reason. If  
Benhabib perhaps overestimates the current historically transformative power o f moral 
dialogue, Habermas in his crisis theory o f deliberative democracy normalizes and 
normativizes its increasingly anemic character. Both thinkers in their more mature work 
surrender to the ‘facts’ prematurely in foreclosing the ‘anticipatory-utopian critique o f the 
present.’
The full force of Habermas’ own normative theory ultimately can only be adequately 
expressed in institutions very different from the liberal status quo. Habermas has attempted 
to blunt these concerns by denying the thesis o f the culture industry, upon which so much o f 
the focus o f the first-generation critical theorists centered. Habermas has stated in between 
Facts and Norms that the thesis o f a totally administered society simply lacks empirical 
confirmation. Habermas seems oddly insensitive, however, to the concern that much o f 
what would stop short o f the total administration of culture would constitute democratic deficits. 
Public and private autonomy are by no means guaranteed simply because we have not (yet) 
reached the point o f the direct administration o f consciousness. What the thesis o f the 
culture industry suggests at the very least is that the integrity o f everyday communication 
should not be taken for granted, and that the discursive public sphere itself, as well as the
64 Habermas. “Three Normative Models o f Democracy,” p. 250
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arena o f social action, should be a topic o f critical discourse. W hat is needed then is an 
‘anticipatory-utopian critique’ o f the present public sphere.
The risk in proposing such an anticipatory-utopian critique is that it may well fall into 
a utopianism in the pejorative sense. It is against such charges that Benhabib defended 
deliberative democracy against institutional realists. More specifically, any conception 
oriented by Benhabib’s earlier work runs the utopian risk o f calling for an ultra- 
individualistic public sphere that, while calling for the accommodation o f individual life- 
histories and the norms of friendship and solidarity, simply cannot be accommodated in 
complex, modem societies. Indeed, this was precisely the charge that Nancy Fraser made 
against Critique, Norm, and Utopia at the time o f its publication. While concurring with 
Benhabib’s critique of Habermas’ “generalized other,” Fraser at that time also took issue 
with Benhabib’s notion o f “concrete others,” arguing that as a concept it lacked any political 
import. Rather, Fraser replaced Benhabib’s individualistic “concrete others” with an 
associational “collective concrete others.” Norms such as solidarity and relevant 
considerations, such as life histories, are to be accommodated in discourse then through 
politically constituted, concrete collectivities.
It may then seem a little ironic to propose Nancy Fraser’s current theoretical work as 
a model o f anticipatory-utopian critique in and of the public sphere. If, according to Fraser, 
Benhabib’s early work was too utopian, the implicit claim in Fraser’s more recent work is 
that Benhabib is not being utopian enough. The apparent irony, however, is dispelled when 
we remember that in moving to questions o f politics and institutionalization in her 
deliberative democratic account, questions that Critique, Norm, and Utopia failed to answer, 
Benhabib adopted significantly more o f the Habermasian framework than she had in her 
earlier work. The inclusion o f “concrete others” in the deliberative democratic account then
55
proceeded largely through existing democratic institutions in the state and civil society. The 
over-normativization o f the civil public sphere I argued was accompanied by a reification of 
existing monetary and bureaucratic institutions as the “natural” complements o f the public 
sphere in modem societies. Fraser’s work, by contrast, has not exhibited such a large 
theoretical shift o f emphasis. Rather Fraser’s work can be seen as a continued working-out 
o f the basic structure o f Benhabib’s early work, mediating such concepts like the politics o f 
transfiguration and fulfillment, in both their harmonies and tensions. The real irony then 
might be that Fraser has stayed the course and developed the program outlined in Critique, 
Norm, and Utopia in a more consistent manner than Benhabib herself, who in the end adopts 
much o f the conservative and juridical Habermasian program that Critique, Norm, and Utopia 
had originally set out to criticize.
Much o f the criticism contained herein is itself consonant with Habermas’ own 
positions at the level o f normative theory. Habermas himself seems to retreat suddenly from 
such an application in the face o f the fact o f pluralism, with which he concludes only liberal 
institutions can contend. Habermas’ bracketing though o f socio-economic considerations 
prevents him from a full consideration o f the issues, in particular the degree to which the 
very institutions Habermas endorses to contend with pluralism mediate and help to 
engender the particular, seemingly intractable form o f that cultural pluralism. Habermas 
does not consider the extent to which strategic and antagonistic political and economic 
spheres might exacerbate a seemingly ‘intractable’ pluralism. An antagonistic cultural 
pluralism cannot simply be used then to justify the very arrangements that help constitute 
that very antagonism and might take on very different, perhaps non-antagonistic, forms 
under different social arrangements. The ‘radical democratic meaning o f society’ o f which
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Habermas approves may itself only be able to take root in a more radical institutional 
arrangement The public sphere o f deliberation is not a natural process; it is made by us. 
The question then becomes whether or not it gets made deliberately. Under (radically?) 
different but practicable historical conditions with social actors thinking through different 
social categories, the ‘force o f the better argument’ may be more binding than simple legal 
conformity or fear o f prosecution is today.
While calling for an expanded autonomous sphere o f solidarity, Habermas’ insistence 
that the sluices o f legitimate influence tun only from the public sphere to the political system 
makes the call unfortunately timid; its historical end point is a reflective welfare state.
Habermas then remains caught in what Benhabib previously called the “politics o f 
fulfillment”65
The politics o f  fulfillment envisages that the society o f  the future attains more adequately
what present society has left unaccomplished. It is the culmination o f  the implicit logic o f
the present. The politics o f  transfiguration emphasizes the emeigence o f  qualitatively new
needs, and modes o f  association, which burst open the utopian potential o f  the old. Within
a critical social theory the articulation o f  norms continues the universalist promise o f
bourgeois revolutions — justice, equality, cavil tights, democracy, and publicity — while the
articulation o f  utopia continues the tradition o f  eady socialist, communitarian, and anarchist
movements — the formation o f  a community o f  needs and solidarity, and qualitatively
transformed relations to inner and outer nature. In short, while norms have the task o f
articulating the demands o f  justice and human worthiness, utopias portray modes o f
friendship, solidarity, and human happiness. Despite their essential tension, a critical social
theory is only rich enough to address us in the present, insofar as it can do justice to both  
„ 66 moments.
Is deliberative democracy then a critical theory o f society? In Habermas’ continuing Kantian 
trajectory, the answer decidedly seems to be no. In the case o f Benhabib, the answer is more 
complex. In her own early formulations of discourse ethics, she certainly tried to do justice 
to both the politics o f fulfillment and the politics o f transformation. Since deliberative
66 Benhabib. Critique, Norm and Utopia, p. 13
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democracy is grounded in discourse ethics, this suggests a possible account o f deliberative 
democracy that would also try to do justice to both moments. In fact, as I suggested in my 
discussion o f Habermas’ account o f the democratic tradition, deliberative democracy’s 
abandonment o f liberalism’s private and fixed conception o f individual needs and rights, as 
well as republicanism’s conservative and substantive ethical totalities, in favor o f free­
wheeling deliberation between equal participants, suggests even a particular ‘elective affinity’ 
o f deliberative democracy with a politics o f transformation. Such potentials are obscured by 
Habermas’ hitching o f such a conception to the issue o f the legitimation of law in a 
democratic and capitalist sociopolitical order. Benhabib herself did not follow up Critique, 
Norm, and Utopia with a critical theory o f deliberative democracy. While remnants remain in 
the concepts o f a more self-regulating social order and flexibility in the institutional 
arrangement of associations, these liberalizations o f Habermas’ ultimately ‘liberal’ theory of 
deliberative democracy are still aimed at norms rather than utopia. Deliberative democracy 
self-consciously is conceived as an account o f  existing democratic institutions and remains 
therefore caught in the conceptions o f bourgeois revolutions and the ‘politics of fulfillment.’ 
The reason may be in part that while, more abstractly, democracy offers tremendous 
transformative possibilities — as for Marx when true democracy started history really began — 
the critical theoretic tradition, running from Hegel to Marx to the Frankfurt School, offered 
few resources for a concrete democratic theory. This would make the liberal, Anglo 
American tradition inviting. By making liberalism its primary interlocutor and opponent, 
however, deliberative democracy perhaps let it set too many o f the terms o f the debate and 
wound up absorbing much o f its framework, in particular its institutional account In 
addition, there has been the transformation of an analytic distinction between 
communicative and instrumental action, which opened up the possibility o f providing both
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stronger and more coherent normative foundations for critical theory, as well as tools for 
more cogent social analysis, into institutional distinctions like that between the public sphere 
and bureaucratic mechanisms or market society. This institutional identification has blunted 
a potentially critical theory of deliberative democracy by giving spheres a certain normative 
inviolability from interference, even while in reality they are heavily mediated. A critical 
theory o f deliberative democracy would start then not with a normative idealization o f the 
public sphere, but with a combination of practical philosophy and social science in order to 
show how the promise of a vigorous public sphere is continuingly broken by cultural, 
political, and economic hierarchies. This would be an ‘anticipatory-utopian critique of the 
present public sphere.’
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